Keynote: David Carrier

Is Danto's Aesthetic Truly Universal? (click to download full pdf version)

David Carrier

Arthur Danto has always said that his aesthetic, like his account of action, history and knowledge, is absolutely general. His definition of art describes works of art in all cultures. In making that claim, he goes against the dominant ways of thinking of his fellow art critics, and also, I believe, of most art historians. But his analysis does grow out of a long philosophical tradition. The central concern of philosophical aesthetics is to define art. Until we know what art is, we cannot properly describe its history, interpret it, or explain why it is significant.

In looking at the history of these definitions of art, the questions posed by historicism, relativism, and multiculturalism, are especially pressing. Within the West the forms of art have changed dramatically over time. Some philosophers thought that art was representation. But then abstract art was created. Other aestheticians said that art was expression. But then works of art that were not expressive were created. No one in 1850 could have imagined cubism; and in 1910, who could have imagined conceptual art? This is why the older general definitions of art are no longer acceptable. Given that such radically new forms of art have been developed relatively recently, why should that process not continue? When we look to China, India and the Islamic world we find very different forms of art. Chinese use scroll paintings; Indians sculpt Hindu gods; Muslims make calligraphy and decoration. Many of these works of art look very different from ours. And because the Chinese, Indians and Muslims have exotic customs, political institutions and religions, we can reasonably expect that their art will be unlike ours. And so it is natural to ask if Western-style definitions will accommodate this art.

Although Danto the art critic has very wide ranging interests, the examples of Danto the aesthetician almost always come from Western art. Were a sociologist of religion to offer a general theory based solely upon Christianity and Judaism, it would be natural to wonder whether his analysis applied also to Buddhism, Daoism and Hinduism. Danto’s working procedure raises similar problems. But the philosopher, of course, is not a mere sociologist, who gathers examples and then offers a description, which may need to be revised when further examples are gathered. After describing the nature of knowledge and our relationship to the world the philosopher offers a very general account of the identity of art...